Lazarretos by Duvall, Edward
 Res Medica, New Series No.2, 1980             Page 1 of 8 
Duvall, E. Lazarretos, Res Medica, New Series No.2, 1980, pp. 17-23                                                       doi:10.2218/resmedica.v0i2.925 
 
 
 
 
 
Lazarretos 
 
 
Dr. Edward Duvall 
M.A., D. Phil., M.B., Ch.B. 
Past Senior President of the Royal Medical Society from his Valedictory Address to the Society 
 
 
Abstract Tonight I would like to talk about Lazarettos. An alternative title might be "a historico-economic study in depth of socially accepted means of community behaviour and preventative disease containment in the ongoing epidemic enzootic disease situation", or more shortly — "To flee or not to flee". I would like to discuss the various attitudes and preventative measures taken by populations when they are threatened by an outbreak of an epidemic infection. By the way, for those of you who are still wondering what a "Lazaretto" is and have not found out where the dictionary is in the library — it is derived from the Italian word "Lazaretto" and is a house for the reception of the diseased poor, especially lepers. Lazar houses were a particularly popular means of controlling epidemic disease in the Middle Ages — but more of that anon.                   Copyright Royal Medical Society. All rights reserved. The copyright is retained by the author and the Royal Medical Society, except where explicitly otherwise stated. Scans have been produced by the Digital Imaging Unit at Edinburgh University Library. Res Medica is supported by the University of Edinburgh’s Journal Hosting Service: http://journals.ed.ac.uk   ISSN: 2051-7580 (Online)   ISSN: 0482-3206 (Print)     
Res Medica is published by the Royal Medical Society, 5/5 Bristo Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9AL  
Res Medica, New Series No.2, 1980: 17-23 doi:10.2218/resmedica.v0i2.925 
LAZARRETOS
A n  Outline of the Measures taken Against Epidemic Disease from Biblical Times 
to the Ascent of Queen Victoria to the Throne (1837)
by
Dr. Edward Duvall, M.A., D. Phil., M.B., Ch.B.
Past Senior President of the Royal Medical Society from his 
Valedictory Address to the Society
Tonight I would like to talk about Lazarettos. A n  
alternative title might be "a  historico-economic 
study in depth of socially accepted means of 
comm unity behaviour and preventative disease 
containment in the ongoing epidemic enzootic 
disease situation", or more shortly — "T o  flee or 
not to flee". I would like to discuss the various 
attitudes and preventative measures taken by 
populations when they are threatened by an out­
break of an epidemic infection. By the way, for 
those of you who are still wondering what a 
"Lazare tto " is and have not found out where the 
dictionary is in the library — it is derived from  the 
Italian word "Lazare tto " and is a house for the 
reception of the diseased poor, especially lepers. 
Lazar houses were a particularly popular means of 
controlling epidemic disease in the Middle Ages — 
but more o f that anon.
The measures taken by any group against a 
sudden outbreak of disease obviously depend upon 
the current theory of its causation. Probably 
the first hypothesis explaining the universe was a 
magical one where anthropomorphic supernatural 
forces decided the sequence of events. According 
to this view epidemic disease was caused by a 
righteous and avenging God, or fickle and feck­
less deities. Thus, the rational approach to an 
epidemic was to placate the offended party, or 
parties. The spread of the twelfth plague of Egypt 
where the first born of the Egyptians and their 
cattle were killed was combated, in an attempt 
to appease Jehova, by allowing the Children of 
Israel to depart. Similarly, when the Philistines 
captured the A rk  of the Covenant, they were
stricken by a lethal disease, characterised by an 
outbreak o f "emerods in their secret parts". 
The "lords o f the Philistines" and their "priests 
and diviners" sent back the A rk  and compensation 
— or hush money of five golden emerods and five 
golden mice to the Israelites in an attempt to 
divert the wrath of God (with a singular lack of 
success). A n  emerod is said to be a haemorrhoid — 
the mind boggles at what a golden one looks 
like; other authorities claim that emerods are 
"bu b oe s" and that the association with mice 
suggests the Ph ilistines knew of the connection 
between plague and rats.
A  similar belief in divine displeasure led to the 
rise of the Flagellant sect during the years 1348-50. 
The Flagellants were large bands of itinerant 
penitants who toured the countryside scourging 
themselves and performing other monstrous 
penances. Thus they took upon themselves the sins 
of the citizens of towns they passed that were 
threatened by the Black Death in exchange for 
board and lodging.
This belief that disease was a divine punishment 
persisted in a diluted form into the seventeenth 
century as the regulations issued during the out­
break o f bubonic plague in London in 1629 
had, along with quarantine instructions, 
ordinances to suppress such ungodly pastimes as 
stage plays, bear-baitings, tumbling, rope dancing, 
prize fencing, cock-fighting and bull baiting. 
The number of ale-houses was to be reduced and 
the rules preventing the sale and consumption of 
meat on fast days were strengthened.
In medieval times this belief in malignant
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external influences was modified to throw the 
blame on unfavourable conjunctions of the 
planets. G uy de Chauliac thought that the plague 
of 1348 could be, in part, ascribed to the influence 
of Saturn, Jupiter and Mars in providing a 
favourable environment for the plague which, in 
cooperation with a patient's individual diathesis 
led to an outbreak of the disease.
The first attempts to postulate a physical cause 
for disease rather than a spiritual one were made 
by the Greeks. Hippocrates in "A irs, Waters, 
Places" expounded the doctrine that adverse winds 
and atmospheres might be responsible for disease. 
During the plague of Athens in 430 B.C. 
Thucydides describes the Athenians lighting fires 
to try and purify the air. They hedged their bets 
by supplicating their gods (in case Hippocrates 
was wrong). Empedocles and Acron (two 
physicians of the time) are credited by legend to 
have been able to control these bad winds. There 
is a possibility that they had the mountain passes 
through which the poisonous winds were blowing 
down onto Athens, blocked, as a public health 
measure, thus giving rise to this legend.
The theory that a miasma caused disease 
developed into the belief that bad smells would 
have the same effect. This idea was current in 
Anglo-Saxon England and was probably the 
basis for the numerous edicts issued during out­
breaks of bubonic plague much later in London 
in 1349, 1629 and 1665 and in Edinburgh in 
1585 to enforce the inhabitants of these cities to 
keep the streets free of the ubiquitous filth and to 
control trades such as fat rendering, tallow candle- 
making and fleshing which produced noisome 
smells. In London in 1665, for example, laystalls, 
i.e. middens, had to be made far from the city, 
unwholesome fish and flesh and musty corn was 
not to be sold and no hogs, dogs, cats, pigeons or 
ponies were to be kept in the city.
A  last vestige of this belief in bad air was seen 
during the outbreak of yellow fever in Philadelphia 
in 1793 when the Town Major had to forbid the 
practice of lighting bonfires in the street to purify 
the air. He later had to ban the firing of guns 
which was also thought to have some effect upon 
the constitution of the atmosphere.
With these two theories of causation of disease 
— that either supernatural forces or climatic 
influences produced plagues there was little that a
civil authority could do when the community 
was threatened by an epidemic except pray and 
hope for a change in the wind. However, with the 
advent of the Black Death in the 1340 's came the 
realisation that epidemic diseases were contagious 
and that measures might be taken to prevent the 
spread of the disease both to the community and 
within it. Boccaccio mentions that in Florence in 
1348 it was recognised that attendants of bubonic 
plague victims could catch the disease from their 
patients and also from their fomites.
Once this was realised policies of isolation were 
instituted, primarily by the Italians who in the 
succeeding centuries were always at the forefront 
of sanitary organisation. (However much they may 
have slipped back lately). They developed the con­
cept of quarantine and o f a cordon sanitaire as 
protection against epidemic disease.
In 1404 the Council of Health of Venice 
opened the first quarantine station and lazaretto 
on the island of Santa Maria de Nazareth — two 
miles from the city. Here all people and goods 
arriving from the Orient (from whence the plague 
was believed to emanate) were confined for 
forty days. This period was apparently chosen 
rather arbitrarily as both Moses and Christ spent 
forty days in the wilderness. This method was 
widely adopted. In London a quarantine station 
for ships and their cargoes was set up on the lower 
reaches of the Thames in 1663 to stop the plague 
spreading from Amsterdam and Hamburg. 
Typically, Pepys complained that the 30 day 
isolation period could not strictly be called a 
quarantine. In Scotland a quarantine period of 
15 days was chosen. This approaches the actual 
incubation time of bubonic plague which is at 
most 14 days. From the inauguration of the use of 
quarantine it was realised that consigned goods as 
well as the sick themselves might spread the 
disease. Cargoes were often fumigated with 
sulphur or vinegar or simply exposed to the air and 
sunshine for a time before they were admitted 
into a town. In the seventeenth century the 
Scots burghs had a regulation that any man who 
wanted to claim goods that came from a place 
where there was plague had to live with them and 
handle them for a set period of time to show that 
they were non-infectious.
The Italians built up an organisation which 
united the many warring states of the "geograph-
I
ical expression" that was Italy in an attempt to 
stop the spread of plague — especially during the 
years 1618 to 1659 when war and disease were 
both endemic. They had an elaborate system of 
health passes — first introduced in 1485 by the 
Venetians — as well as a swift system of communi­
cation between the Health Boards of each major 
town allowing each to close its frontiers against 
travellers and goods from any district where plague 
had been discovered. The normal practice was to 
establish a cordon sanitaire round the town rather 
than to seal o ff the town itself.
This system was rarely effective in stopping the 
spread of disease both because of inefficiency in 
enforcing any ban on travellers from a particular 
area and also because there was resistance from the 
influential mercantile interests of the towns to any 
admission of the presence of plague as this 
seriously affected their trade. A third reason was 
that in the case of bubonic plague the regulations 
only affected the movements of relatively 
inefficient vectors of the disease (man and his 
fleas) and not those of the primary vectors — the 
rat and the rat flea.
Once the pestilences had gained entry into a 
community then the reactions of the civic author­
ities were remarkably similar in Italy and Britain 
from 1350 or so to the 1660's. Regulations that all 
suspicious deaths were to be reported were first 
issued in 1374 by Visconte Bernabo of Reggio 
in Calabria. He devolved this responsibility onto 
the clergy and many communities followed suit, 
for example, Venice, in 1485 and Vienna in 1562. 
The London regulations of 1663 required the 
master of the house to give notice within two 
hours o f persons complaining of blotch, purple, 
swelling or any other symptoms not assignable to 
another disease. In case the master of the house 
was not to be trusted to report plague/'searchers" 
were often appointed to go round the community 
and detect victims. In London, from 1532, these 
searchers, who were elderly and supposedly wise 
matrons (not medically qualified), provided the 
data for the parish clerks to compile the Bills of 
Mortality. These Bills analysed the causes of all 
deaths within the parishes of London and were 
intended to warn the Court and the nobility that 
London was becoming too unhealthy and that it 
was time to remove to Windsor or Oxford.
Once the existence of cases of epidemic disease 
(usually bubonic plague) was known then they and 
their contacts were usually sequestrated. The first 
incidence of this was in Reggio in 1374 where 
regulations were issued that all those sick of the 
plague were to be taken out of the town into the 
fields to die or to recover. All those who had 
nursed the sick had to go into isolation for ten 
days before having contact with anyone 
afterwards. This harsh attitude towards the 
unfortunate sick persisted and is also seen in the 
proclamation of James IV in 1497 that those 
citizens of Edinburgh suffering from venereal 
disease (at that time an epidemic) should be exiled 
to the Inch (in the Firth of Forth) until cured. 
A more humane attitude eventually prevailed and 
two policies were adopted — sometimes both at 
once. The Italian solution (and that used in 
Edinburgh) was to provide pest houses or 
lazarettos outside the town to house the sick and 
their contacts whilst that adopted in London was 
to isolate both categories of people in their homes.
The Italian pest houses were sometimes custom 
built — often on a very large scale. That in Milan 
in 1630 held 15,000 patients and the Veronese 
one had 4,000 inmates. These lazarettos had 
separate divisions for the infected and their 
contacts. They also had attached convalescent 
homes as those recovering from the disease were 
recognised as infectious.The smaller towns 
requisitioned a building fo r a lazaretto when 
required. In Prato a monastery outside the town 
walls was taken over. Conditions in these pest 
houses must have been very unpleasant as in Prato 
there were five to a bed and shortages of food 
and other necessities. They did, however, have a 
staff of surgeons (physicians, being of a higher 
class, usually thought themselves too valuable to 
expose themselves to infection) and lay nurses — 
unlike the British lazar houses. In the smaller 
towns which could not afford large lazarettos 
the contacts of the sick were confined to their 
houses rather than also taken into the pest house 
and they were supplied with food by the 
municipal authorities.
In Edinburgh there was no permanent lazaretto 
established but "huts and ludges" were erected 
on various parts of the Burgh Muir when the need 
arose. This stretched from the present Royal 
Infirmary to Blackford Hill. In 1501 the town
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council authorised the construction of St. Roch 's 
chapel near the present Astley Ainslie Hospital 
and provided medical attendance there for any 
sick of the plague. In 1585 temporary hospitals 
were set up near the site of the Astley Ainslie 
Hospital and at the ruined convent of St. 
Catherine of Siena (to the south of the present 
Royal Hospital for Sick Children). "Cleansers and 
curers of the pest" were appointed by the town 
council to attend the sick at these hospitals. The 
pay was high for those who survived. Alex 
Fraynche was given a free house and a pension for 
life for being in charge of the staff. Later in the 
outbreak o f 1585 the sick were segregated at 
Adam  Purvis's Acre — to the west of the Astley 
Ainslie site and convalescent centres were set up 
at Morningside, Canaan and Greenhill.
A  different approach was adopted in London. 
The first two pest houses were only set up in 
1636, which was probably just as well as they had 
a mortality rate of 98%. The main measure to 
prevent the spread of infection was to seal up any 
house where there was plague with its occupants 
still inside. In 1583, 1606, 1629, 1663, 1665 and 
1666 proclamations were made that plague 
stricken houses were to be shut up with their 
inmates for 40 days and a red cross and the 
inscription "Lord , have mercy upon us." painted 
on the door. Often guards were provided to see 
that no-one entered or left the house. This 
measure only helped to ensure the spread of 
plague throughout the inhabitants of the house. 
A  classical example of the dangers of isolating a 
group o f people together once one has contracted 
plague is that of the village of Eyam in Derbyshire. 
In 1665 the village was visited with the plague and 
the rector N. Mompesson persuaded the villagers 
not to flee. Their continued and maintained 
contact with the infected rats of Eyam led to the 
death of 7 5%  of the human population.
With some o f the populace immured in their 
homes and trade with the outside world stopped 
some form of poor relief was required to stop 
famine killing off more than the plague. Edinburgh 
in 1585 was the first city in Britain to institute 
this and an official was paid six pounds Scots a 
month to distribute bread and drink to the needy. 
The Italians and the burghers o f London followed 
suit by providing a subsistence diet to those 
confined to their homes. The administration of
Prato also gave subsidies to those whose livelihood 
was directly effected by the plague and the 
measures taken against it.
Further methods to prevent the spread of 
infection apart from segregation of victims were 
usually used. In Prato the bedding of those who 
had died of the plague was destroyed with most 
o f their possessions that were hairy or w oolly as 
it was thought that the contagion adhered more 
readily to these objects than to shiny metal 
surfaces. Anything too valuable to destroy was 
disinfected. All those leaving the convalescent 
home were supplied with a fresh suit of clothing. 
Houses where plague had broken out were fumi­
gated with sulphur, lime or vinegar and often 
replastered. In Edinburgh it was prohibited to 
wash the clothing of plague victims in the South 
Loch which was the main source of the city's 
water supply. One of the main duties of the 
cleansers in attendance at the pest houses on the 
Burgh M uir was to boil the clothes of the sick in a 
large iron cauldron provided. The badge of their 
office was the long cleek provided for this job.
A  very common procedure was to ban all 
public assemblies especially those which might be 
construed as ungodly. In London, public 
gatherings, particularily at stage plays and other 
entertainments were banned. This served the 
double purpose of preventing contagion and 
reducing any likelihood of Divine wrath as an 
aetiological factor. Foreigners were frequently 
expelled, as in London in 1580 —  perhaps because 
they were "G od le ss" and might also have come 
from a plague stricken place. The Jews in 
particular were given a rough time; many of them 
were slaughtered on the pretext that they had 
been poisoning the wells to produce disease or 
that they were spreading the plague by distributing 
pus from bubos. The reasons for this antisemitism 
are complex. The very presence o f the Jews was 
probably regarded as a reason for Divine 
displeasure whilst they themselves were the only 
usurers and source of capital in the medieval 
economy and were for that reason hated by those 
who had to make use of them as bankers and 
moneylenders. A  third reason is that the author­
ities may have whipped up pogroms against an 
easily recogniseable subpopulation as scapegoats 
for the administration's own inability to counter
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the plague.
Having outlined the administrative measures 
against epidemic disease taken in the fourteenth 
to  the seventeenth centuries in Europe, let us 
examine the organisations which took them. The 
Italians, at the forefront o f the fight against 
disease, had special bodies set up to  deal w ith  the 
problems. The first of these was in Venice in 1404 
when a Council o f Health, consisting o f three 
noblemen was set up to  decide upon policies to be 
used against bubonic plague. Venice was in the 
vanguard as it was one of the chief European ports 
trading w ith the Orient. Other Italian cities 
followed this example. I shall discuss the organ­
isation in an Italian town by referring to  the town 
o f Prato in Tuscany (13 miles from Florence) 
mainly because some industrious Italian has 
written a book about it  all. When Prato was 
threatened by plague the town council established 
a Health Board o f four (later eight) laymen —  
usually gentlemen —  to  organise the fight against 
the disease. To advise the Board were the local 
college o f physicians, the doctors of the district 
and health officers seconded from the capital, 
Florence. It is probable that expert advice was not 
often required as the measures taken to stop the 
movement of people and to  run a pest house did 
not require any medical knowledge. To help 
supervise the Health Board employees —  25 for 
a population of about 17,000 —  the Board chose a 
layman Provveditore della Sanita, one 
Christophano du Guilio Ceffini. Cristophano 
wrote that the duties of his post were to:
(1) trust in God, the Virgin and the Saints,
(2) disinfect w ith sulphur and perfumes, 
rooms and houses where there had been 
sickness and death,
(3) segregate the sick,
(4) burn fomites,
(5) shut up houses where infected people 
had been and to quarantine the inmates 
fo r 22 days,
(6) stop trade,
The city Health Board also thought that he 
should:
(7) administer the pest house,
(8) isolate contacts and pay subsidies
to those who required them i.e. those who
were unable to  earn a living because of 
the effects o f the anti-plague regulations,
(9) end quarantine on houses at the
appropriate time as some people were 
keeping themselves shut up in their homes 
after the required time in order to collect 
the subsidy paid to  the inhabitants o f all 
closed houses,
(10) enforce all Health Board decisions,
(11) audit all the subsidy accounts,
(12) supervise the workings o f the public 
health service and ensure that the 
patients were treated well and that 
the dead were buried.
A  tall order fo r a man paid the same wage as the 
municipal grave digger!
Thus the Italians had an organisation exclus­
ively to  deal w ith the situation. The central 
government formulated the policy to  be taken —  
prevention of movement into an uninfected area 
or out o f an infected one, separate segregation of 
the sick, the convalescent and the contact, a dis­
infection programme, subsidies to  be paid to  those 
effected by the plague. In the towns there were 
physicians and surgeons employed by the muni­
cipal authorities (not exclusively during epidemics) 
to  treat those who could not otherwise have 
afforded medical care. In the countryside the 
local justices were instructed to popularise the 
current remedies against the plague if the populace 
had no access to  a physician. The local govern­
ment set up and paid fo r its own apparatus to 
carry out these policies w ith  the help (or 
hindrance) o f a Commissioner from the capital 
who reported back on the state o f affairs.
This organisation should be compared w ith the 
contemporary situation in Edinburgh. Let us take 
the epidemic of bubonic plague o f 1585 as an 
example. There the town council assumed fu ll 
responsibility fo r coping w ith the situation. This 
was hindered at first because James V i's place­
man as Provost, the Earl o f Arran, decided that 
Edinburgh was altogether too unhealthy fo r him 
when he discovered plague was present and the 
council could only function once a new, less pusill­
animous Provost was chosen. They then directly 
issued ordinances o f very much the same import 
as those of the Italians. Pest houses w ith separate
21
accommodation for the infected and their contacts 
were to be set up on the Burgh Muir, a town 
surgeon, attendants for the pest house and an 
official to pay subsidies to the destitute were to 
be appointed and all public assemblies were to be 
banned. It is d ifficult at this late stage to compare 
the efficiency of the two systems — the specialised 
and the ad hoc but it is interesting to notice how 
the two different approaches led to a common 
solution.
One interesting facet of the story is the pro­
blem of the execution of the arrangements made. 
One difficulty encountered in both Edinburgh and 
Prato was the lack of money. It was very expensive 
to set up a pest house and to distribute even the 
bare minimum of food to keep alive those 
confined to their homes or unemployed because 
of the plague. It was doubly d ifficult to find the 
money because the town had no income from 
customs duties in Italy or from the working of 
public land in Edinburgh. Both administrations 
also could count on a smaller income from taxes 
because of the death or destitution of so many 
ratepayers.
A second difficulty which had to be faced, 
particularly in Italy was pressure from merchants 
to conceal the outbreak of plague or prematurely 
to declare the epidemic over; because of the 
effect on their trade. A very powerful aristocracy 
who complained to higher authority whenever a 
municipal decision interfered with their plans or 
their pleasure did not help matters either.
A third factor was the resistance of the pop­
ulace to any public health measures. The penalties 
for disobedience of statutes and regulations on this 
subject were often capital. The regulations of Vis- 
conte Bernabo in 1374 stated that the clergy were 
to examine the sick. Any clergyman who did not 
report the presence of bubonic plague and anyone 
who ministered to the sick without permission 
was to be burnt at the stake and all their goods 
were forfeit. In Edinburgh every pest house 
had its own gallows and in 1585 two men were 
hanged for stealing infected clothes. Earlier in the 
century a number of women were judicially 
drowned for failing to report the presence of 
plague. In London, in 1636, health officers who 
failed to enforce the regulations were threatened 
w ith Newgate.
These draconian measures probably stemmed
both from the generally severe sentencing policy 
for trivial crimes in those days and from a desire 
to make the consequences of disobedience of the 
regulations more unpleasant than the results of 
obedience. It must have been very difficult to per­
suade people to admit to the presence of plague in 
their houses when the sick person would be carted 
off to a pest house with few comforts, little 
attention and even less of a chance of survival and 
his contacts would be immolated in their houses 
for a period without any means of earning a live­
lihood and having to survive, if they were lucky, 
on a meagre ration provided by the town.
A change of attitudes began to occur in the 
eighteenth century. This was heralded by the 
report commissioned from Richard Mead by the 
Secretary of State when there was a threat of the 
bubonic plague spreading to Britain from 
Marseilles in 1720. "A  short discourse concerning 
pestilential contagion and the methods to be 
used to prevent i t "  ran to seven editions in the 
first year of publication and contained several 
revolutionary ideas. Firstly, it advocated that 
as plague was a disease of the poor who lived 
under dreadful conditions, if they were re-housed 
at public expense and their overcrowding reduced 
then there would be a less suitable environment in 
which the plague could spread. This was the first 
suggestion that a continuous measure should be 
taken against epidemic disease rather than the 
previously intermittent steps whenever a plague 
was imminent. Mead also put forward the idea 
that people should be encouraged to report the 
presence of plague by the payment of fees and the 
appointment of diligent and understanding men 
as searchers instead of old women. He thirdly 
suggested the appointment of officers of state 
(civil and ecclesiastical), magistrates, physicians 
and other responsible members of society to 
central Councils of. Health to watch over the 
nation's wellbeing.
This advise was largely ignored for the next 
hundred years or so except that legislation to 
enforce his ideas on quarantine to contain bubonic 
plague and the removal of the sick to pest houses 
was passed only to be repealed by a different 
government a year later to make a petty political 
point.
The occasion of the adoption of Mead's ideas
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was the cholera outbreak of 1831 which started 
in Sunderland. The response to the threat of 
cholera spreading to the rest of the country was 
similar to that seen in the previous five hundred 
years with the imposition of quarantine 
regulations and the segregation of the sick and 
convalescents. However a consultative Board of 
Health was set up with two non-medical and nine 
medical members. This board advised upon the 
measures to be taken. However this was soon 
supplanted by a central Board of Health with a 
ratio of lay to medically qualified members of 
two to one. This balance or imbalance may have 
been responsible for the definite change in policy 
manifest when this new body took over. The 
element of coercion was removed from the regul­
ations and those groups at risk from the disease 
were identified by official inspectors. Measures to 
improve the nutrition and clothing of the lower 
classes and their temperance, the cleanliness, 
ventilation and space in their homes, and the 
methods of sewage disposal were taken.
A t a local level, short lived Local Health Boards 
were set up to administer dispensaries and to 
educate the people to recognise the first symptoms 
of the cholera so that they would seek early 
treatment.
This change of emphasis from particular 
measures against a disease to the general was soon 
followed by a spate of horrific reports on the state 
of the working classes by Engels (1840), Chadwick 
(1842) and Littlejohn (1865) amongst others and 
the great public health movement, ted by such as 
Sir John Simon, the the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.
What brought about this change of attitude is 
not clear. Cynics and Marxists would say that 
manufacturers realised that a healthy working class 
worked better and was less likely to rise in 
rebellion than a semi-destitute one. Sir John
Simon thought that this change was due to the rise 
of humanitarianism in the eighteenth century and 
the influence of the Wesleys, Whitfield, Jeremy 
Bentham and John Howard. The truth probably 
lies somewhere between the two views.
Thus the history of the administrative measures 
taken against pestilence is a potted history of 
medicine as it reflects the medical dogmata of the 
time. The actions of civil authorities were appro­
priate to the supposed causal factors, be they 
supernatural intervention, the atmosphere or an 
invisible contagion. Usually they were not sure of 
the exact aetiology of epidemic disease and also 
took additional precautions which reflected 
previous but not entirely discredited ideas. It is 
also a brief history of administration and the 
development of local and central government and 
of specialised agencies. Thirdly it shows the 
development of man's feelings towards his fellow 
man. The medieval picture is one of a few self­
less men, usually the humbler surgeons who were 
capable of working with the poor during an 
outbreak of an epidemic disease but of a much 
larger group of the merchantile, professional and 
monied classes who beat an undignified retreat 
whenever there was any threat. Then, throughout 
the eighteenth century the idea rose to the surface 
that the powerful had a responsibility to the 
powerless although there may have been some 
self-interest in that if the sinks of disease were 
removed there would be less change of pestilence 
overflowing from the slums into the drawing 
rooms. It was only when it was realised that trying 
to prevent a contagion entering a community 
where it would flourish was less efficacious than 
removing the factors which allow it to flourish 
that effective preventative measures could be 
implemented. The conquest of epidemic disease 
is more a success for humanitarianism than for 
therapeutics. 
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